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DOCKET NO. F Nathan Hult - 470 ! 
Attorney for Defendant/Appeli: 
110 North 100 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: fani\ • 0 
CLERK SUPREME COURi 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR Ti IE STATE OF UTAH fry^M w n i 
• i 
DEC 2 1991 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v s . 
DONALD WAYNE BROWN, 
Defendant. 
the suggestio 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT 
I ,tso No 'III!!! 1 4H 
Supreme Court, n i* Notification 
Donald Brown, by his attorney submits thj s Supplemental Brief 
pursuant to Rule 201 (e). 
Statement of Case 
The Defendant, i n hi s original brief, raised as an issue 
whether the f ac t that Defei iciai it • s tri a] counse] , Thomas Wi ] lmore, 
was employed as a prosecutor by t :Jie cities of Tremonton and Garland 
at tl ie time he represented the Defendant, constituted a c u m -
:>f i i i terest ai I I den :i eci the Defei idai it due process . 
Because this issue was not raised by Defendant's trial counsel 
either pre-trial motion or during the trial, no rect 
counse ;} I nyiitiMit i pin ' - v*as made a par*- r^-f the '.na, 
record except for the reference made ty counse] in voir dire of a 
prospective juror that he 1 lad prosecuted ,.i . r-, . 
f am 1 1 y I .1 ie pri or y ear , (Tr. i a ] transcript, pp . H 4 - 8 6 ) , 
To establish the fact that Thomas Willmore was continuing to 
be employed as a prosecuting attorney at the time of the trial, 
February 12-15 and 20, 1991, Defendant included in his Reply Brief 
of Appellant the affidavit of Paul Buys, the City Recorder for the 
City of Tremonton, Utah stating that he was the keeper of the 
records for the city, that he was familiar with the records, that 
the city had a contract with Thomas Willmore for legal services, 
and that Thomas Willmore provided prosecution services from the 
date of the attached contract, January 1, 1989 up to the date of 
the affidavit, March 13, 1991. 
The Court granted Defendant's Motion to Supplement the record 
with said Affidavit and Contract on July 16, 1991. 
Issue 
Should this Court take judicial notice of Thomas Willmore's 
employment as a prosecutor by the City of Tremonton at the time he 
represented the Defendant? 
Argument 
It is appropriate for this Court to take judicial notice of 
Defendant's trial attorney's simultaneous employment as a 
prosecuting attorney and Defendant's trial attorney pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Evidence 201. 
Rule 201 (f) provides that "[j Judicial notice may be taken at 
any stage of the proceedings." Rule of Evidence 101 provides that 
"[t]hese rules govern proceedings in the courts of the State, to 
the extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101." Rule 1101 
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(a) provides that H[t]hese rules apply to all actions and 
proceedings in the courts of this State except as otherwise 
provided in Subdivision (b)." No specific exception is provided 
for the appellate courts including the Supreme Court• 
However, the Utah Court of Appeals has suggested that the 
mandatory provision of Rule 201 (d) does not apply to appellate 
courts, but that the taking of judicial notice by the appellate 
court is always discretionary• See Mel Trimble Real Estate v. 
Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988). 
This Court has, in the past, taken judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts. In State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1246, 
ftnt. 4 (Utah, 1988) judicial notice was taken of the fact that 
belief in divine revelation and personal spiritual experiences are 
part of the Mormon religion. In Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 731 P.2d 1079, 1083, ftnt. 2 (Utah 1986), the 
Court took judicial notice of the fact that while women as a group 
tend to be smaller in size and have less physical strength than men 
do as a group, the size and strength of individual men and women 
are arrayed over a continuum. In Redd v. Negley, 785 P. 2d 1098 
(Utah, 1989), the dissent took judicial notice that Plaintiff as 
a full-blooded American Indian was a member of a cognizable racial 
group and the population of San Juan County in 1984 was 
approximately 45% Indian. 
Rule 201 (b) provides that H[a] judicially noticed fact must 
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction , • • . or (2) 
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capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." 
It would appear that this rule is aimed at enhancing the goal 
of judicial economy. In this case, or instance, it would make 
little sense to remand this case to the trial court for 
determination of the fact of Thomas Willmore's employment as a 
prosecutor at the time he represented the Defendant in his trial. 
The Clerk of the City of Tremonton is the best source for that 
information and he has, in addition, provided a copy of the 
employment contract. The fact that the State of Utah has not filed 
any countering affidavit seems to be clear indication that the 
information supplied by the clerk is accurate. 
Other Courts have recognized that the identity and employment 
of a public official is a proper subject for judicial notice. 
People v. Rhodes, 524 P.2d 363, 364 (Cal. 1974). 
In addition, public policy strongly supports the taking of 
judicial notice in this case. Article 8, section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution places with the Supreme Court the duty to "govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law and the 
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law." This 
Court has an obligation to resolve this issue of conflict for the 
state bar and it is appropriate to take judicial notice of the 
requested facts in this case in order to do so. 
Last but not least is the interest in according the defendant 
due process in this case without placing on him the additional 
burden of an evidentiary hearing on this uncontested fact in the 
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trial court or requiring him to pursue post-conviction relief to 
establish this adjudicative fact, one which his trial attorney 
should have raised and resolved as part of the trial record. 
Conclusion 
Defendant requests this Court to take judicial notice of his 
trial counsel's simultaneous employment as a prosecuting attorney, 
find a per se denial of due process, and on this basis as well as 
the others raised on appeal, remand this case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of November, 1991. 
Nathan Hult 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby give notice that I hand-delivered four copies of the 
foregoing Supplemental Brief of Appellant to Counsel for the 
Plaintiff/Appellee, R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capital Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on December 
2, 1991. 
Nathan Hult 
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